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Hearsay and the Confrontation Clause 
 
© 2012 Prof. Lynn McLain 
University of Baltimore School of Law  
(may be reproduced with attribution) 
 
Overview: Only an out-of-court statement (OCS) offered for TOMA = hearsay (HS). The 
Confrontation Clause applies only to “testimonial” HS. 
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Chart 1  FLOW CHART FOR HEARSAY AND CONFRONTATION 
I. ADMISSIBILITY OR EXCLUSION UNDER THE RULES OF EVIDENCE  
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                        No 
Is an OCS of a person being proved? 
For what purpose is the proponent of the 
EVI offering it? Is that purpose relevant to 
an issue in the case? 
In order for the EVI offered to help to prove or disprove 
the relevant fact as to which it is offered, must the fact-
finder rely on the truthfulness/accuracy of a fact that was 
asserted by the Out-of-Court Declarant? 
Does the EVI fall within an exception to the hearsay rule 
(Rules 5-802.1, 5-803, & 5-804)? (Have all of the 
foundation elements for that exception been proved to 
the judge’s satisfaction by a preponderance of the 
evidence [Rule 5-104(a)]?) See Chart 6. 
Yes (then it might be HS evidence (EVI). The person 
who made the OCS is the Out-of-Court Declarant. 
Even a witness on the stand is an Out-of-Court 
Declarant if she is testifying to her own OCS. 
Yes 
Yes 
No (either not an OCS or not by a 
person): not HS (Rule 5-801). 
See Chart 2. 
No (inadmissible: Rule 5-402). 
No:  Not HS; the HS Rule does 
not exclude the EVI. See Chart 3.
No (inadmissible HS: Rule 5-802). 
Yes:  The HS rule does 










           
 
     
 
 
II. THE EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE EVIDENCE RULES!  BUT DOES 
THE CONSITITUTION EXCLUDE IT?  
  A. Confrontation Clause Overview 
 








   
Should the trial judge exercise his 
or her discretion to exclude the 
EVI under Rule 5-403? 
Is the EVI being offered (1) 
against a criminal accused AND 
(2) at a trial on the merits? 
Is the EVI “testimonial hearsay?” 
See Chart 4. 
Yes; inadmissible under another rule (e.g., 5-404 
through 5-412) or a privilege. If, for example, the 
OCS was made in a compromise negotiation, Rule 
5-408 excludes it. 
Does any other specific rule of 




Yes: Inadmissible because of substantial risk of 
unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
No:  Confron. Cl. does not exclude it. 
Yes 
No:  Confron. Cl. does not exclude it. Davis v. 
Washington, 554 U.S. 353 (2006). 
UNLESS the EVI is based on the testimonial 
HS of a Declarant as to whom the defendant’s 
confrontation right is not met. Derr v. State, 422 
Md. 211 (2011). 
PENDING CASE:  Williams v. Illinois (U.S. 
No. 10-8505) raises this question for the content 
of DNA analysis by Cellmark of a vaginal swab 
from the victim, relied on under Fed. R. Evid. 
703 and compared by the testifying expert to her 
own DNA analysis of the defendant’s blood 
sample. (Illinois would distinguish Bullcoming.)  Yes 
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B. If the Confrontation Clause Does Not Exclude the Evidence because the Hearsay 
is Nontestimonial, the Only Remaining Constitutional Safeguard Is the Due Process 
Clause. 
Due process requires that a verdict not be based on unreliable hearsay. 
Lower appellate courts have therefore continued to apply Ohio v. Roberts, 448 US. 56 (1980) to 
evaluate the fact-finder’s reliance on nontestimonial hearsay.  Dictum in Michigan v. Bryant, 131 
S. Ct. 1143 (U.S. 2011), supports this position.   
 
Under Roberts, there is no error if the nontestimonial hearsay relied upon at trial either: 
(1) Qualifies under a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception (probably all those listed in Title 5, 
except statements against penal interest, 5-804(b)(3)); or 
(2) Is shown to have had equivalent “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”
Is the HS Declarant present and subject to 
cross-exam? 
Did the accused have an earlier 
opportunity to cross-examine the 
Declarant about the OCS? 
EVI is excluded unless accused 
FORFEITED confron. right. See Chart 5. 
Is the declarant unavailable to testify (Rule 5-
804(a)? 
Yes: Confron. Cl. does not exclude it. 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004); Lawson v State, 389 Md. 570 
(2005).
No 
No. Confron. Cl. excludes EVI  unless 
accused forfeited confron. right. See Chart 
5. 
Yes 




Chart 2   IS THE EVIDENCE AN “OUT OF COURT STATEMENT” (“OCS”) OF  
     A  PERSON? 
 
A. What is a “Statement”? 
1. Rule 5-801(a) defines a “statement” as “(1) an oral or written assertion or (2) non-
verbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.” 
“Statement” means an assertion of one or more facts or  opinions.  A statement may 
be either an  oral assertion, a written assertion (e.g., note or document), or conduct 
intended as an assertion. 
2. The statement is usually “verbal” (i.e., in words, no matter whether written or oral). 
3. A “statement” also may be nonverbal assertive conduct” clearly intended as a 
substitute for particular words (nodding head to say yes or no, pointing to a 
person in a line-up, raising hand to indicate affirmative answer when asked, “who 
would like to …?”). 
 
4.“Statement does not include implied assertions from nonverbal nonassertive 
conduct (e.g., walking down the street, putting a coat on, raising an umbrella, 
even if offered to show that the person could walk, that it was cold out, or that it 
was raining). 
 
5. “Statement” may, however, include an implied assertion from an utterance in 
words (if the utterance is offered to prove the truth of the assertion and has no 
independent relevance as circumstantial, nonhearsay evidence.   
a. Stoddard v. State, 389 Md. 681 (2005) (Raker, J.) (“Is Erik going to get 
me?” was hearsay because  relevant only if taken to mean “…like he got 
[killed] Calen?”). 
 
b.  Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1 (2005) (Raker, J.)  (hospital bill found in 
residence where defendant and illegal drugs were found was inadmissible 
hearsay when prosecutor argued in closing that hospital would want to be 
sure it had right address so it could be paid). 
 
Judge Greene had held, while on the Court of Special Appeals, that the evidence was 
admissible nonhearsay. Judges Wilner and Battaglia, dissenting, agreed with Judge 
Greene. 
The dissent would have followed those cases that hold that  a name and address on a 
piece of mail are not intended by the writer “as an assertion,” or “not intended to 
communicate the thought that the [named person] lived there,” and thus do not constitute 
hearsay.  Such evidence, rather, is properly admissible “as circumstantial evidence that 
[the defendant] stored his property, including his correspondence,” in the place where it 
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was found, which in turn tends to prove that the defendant exercises control over that 
place. 
c. Fields v. State, 168 Md. App. 22 (2006) (D. Eyler, J.) (evidence that the name “Sat 
Dogg” was displayed on a screen at a bowling alley – the crime scene was properly 
admitted as nonassertive, circumstantial, nonhearsay evidence), aff’d on other grounds, 
395 Md. 758 (2006) (Raker, J.). 
d. In a 5 to 2 vote in Garner v. State, 414 Md. 372  (2010)(Murphy, J.) the 
Court of Appeals held that the trial court had not erred in permitting a 
police officer to testify that he answered the cell phone confiscated from 
the defendant during his arrest, said “hello,” and “a male voice” said, “Yo, 
can I get a 40.”  
Judge Murphy, writing for the majority, reasoned that (1) “[w]hen a telephone is used to 
receive illegal wagers or to receive orders called in by persons who wish to purchase a 
controlled dangerous substance, the telephone becomes an instrumentality of the crime” 
and (2) “the rule against hearsay does not operate to exclude evidence of the ‘verbal act’ 
that established a consequential fact: Petitioner was in possession of a telephone called by 
a person who requested to purchase cocaine.”   
The result of admissibility reached by this decision  conformed to the results obtained for 
decades in the Court of Special Appeals and around the country as to similar evidence of 
telephone calls placing bets or requesting drugs.  The “verbal act”  rationale would 
differentiate the bookie-betting parlor and drug order cases like Garner from cases like 
Stoddard and Bernadyn.  But Garner may indicate a partial retreat from the Stoddard 
majority’s approach.       
The Garner majority could have affirmed under the facts there by looking at the evidence 
as nonassertive, circumstantial, nonhearsay evidence that a phone connected with the 
defendant received such a call, which was relevant even if the caller did not have any 
apparent intention to communicate, to the person who answered the phone, the fact that 
the defendant sold cocaine.  This would be consistent with Judge Wilner’s concurrence 
joined by Judges Greene and Battaglia in Stoddard. 
 
If the Garner majority opinion is read as following this approach, then the evidence in 
Fields also was not hearsay; nor would the evidence in Bernadyn have been hearsay if 
offered for the proper, relevant, limited purpose that something with the defendant’s 
name on it was found at the address where the drugs were found.   
Interestingly, the Garner majority stated:  “We need not either reaffirm or overrule either 
of those fact-specific cases in [Stoddard or Bernadyn] in order to hold that the rule 
against hearsay was not violated by Trooper Gussoni’s testimony about the telephone call 
at issue [in Garner].”  Judges Battaglia and Greene were in the majority in Garner, and 
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were joined by three judges  who joined the court after Stoddard, Bernadyn, and Fields:  
Judges Adkins, Barbera, and Murphy.  Chief Judge Bell and Judge Harrell, the only two 
remaining on the Court of Appeals who were in the majority in Stoddard,  found 
themselves alone in the dissent in Garner. 
e. Carpenter v. State, 196 Md. App. 212, 224-25 (2010) (Thieme, J.) (numbers 
shown on cell phone designating missed and received calls  were not assertions or 
statements of a person; their relevance did not depend upon the belief or accuracy 
of the person(s) who made the calls, and the testimony of police detective to the 
numbers he saw was not hearsay). 
f. In Fair v. State, 198 Md. App. 1 (2011) Kenney, J.), a paycheck with the 
defendant’s name on it, with a pay date of the day before a police officer testified 
he found the paycheck in a car console with a handgun and underneath a bag of 
marijuana, was held to have been properly admitted  by the trial court” “to show 
the Defendant’s possessory interest in the vehicle’….” 
Relying on Garner, as well as several federal cases   (including a U.S. Supreme Court 
decision) holding that paychecks and money orders were not factual assertions, the Court 
of Special Appeals held that the paycheck was a nonhearsay verbal act, relevant and 
offered as “merely circumstantial nonassertive crime scene evidence.” 
The latter part of the rationale is more intellectually  appealing here, because the fact that 
the paycheck bore the defendant’s name and was found in the vehicle linked someone 
with that name to the vehicle, and it was offered for that limited purpose, rather than to 
show that the payor owed or had paid a certain sum.  If it had been offered as to the latter 
purpose, and that fact had been relevant, it would have been relevant as a nonhearsay 
“verbal act.”    
B.  When is a Statement an “Out-of-Court” Statement? 
 1. Rule 5-801(c) defines an out-of-court statement (“OCS”) as “a statement, other than 
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing ….” 
2. “Out-of-court” thus means that the evidence offered today at trial is of a 
statement made by any person somewhere else at another time.  The other place may 
even have been another court proceeding.  
 
3. It is still “out-of-court” EVEN IF THE DECLARANT IS AT TRIAL 
TESTIFYING TO HIS OR HER OWN EARLIER STATEMENT.  (For hearsay 
exceptions requiring that the declarant also testify at trial, see Rule 5-802.1— certain 
prior inconsistent or consistent statements, prior identification of a person, prompt report 




4. Why the preference for live testimony rather than out-of-court statements, even 
of a declarant who is now on the stand? 
 
 a. Better evaluation of demeanor evidence; 
 b. Better ability to cross-examine live memory; and 
 c. Out-of-court statement may not have been under oath. 
C. To Be Covered by the Hearsay Rule, a Statement Must Have Been Made by “a  
     Person 
 
1. Rule 5-801 refers to “a person.”  It does not include statements by animals – 
such as a crowing rooster or a barking dog – or “statements” by machines, 
because neither can be cross-examined.  
 
Foundation evidence regarding the training of the dog or the routine maintenance of the 
machines may be required, to show relevance and reliability. 
 
2. Numbers Shown on Cell Phone for Incoming Calls was Nonhearsay. 
Carpenter v. State, 196 Md. App. 212, 224-25 (2010) Thieme, J.) (numbers shown on 
cell phone designating missed and received calls were not assertions or statements of a 
person; their relevance did not depend upon the belief or accuracy of the person(s) who 
made the calls, and the testimony of the police detective to the numbers he saw was not 
hearsay). 
 
3.  An Important Issue in the Confrontation Clause Context  
See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2007) (J. Niemeyer) 
(20 pages of data generated by Armed Forces Institute’s Forensic Toxology 
Laboratory chromatograph machine and computers, showing that the defendant’s 
blood sample contained ethanol and phencyclidine, were not hearsay, because the 
machine performing chromatography on the defendant’s blood was not a “person” 
and could not be a “declarant” under Fed. R. Evid. 801), cert. denied (U.S. 2009); 
United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 361-62 (7th Cir. 2008) (instruments’ 
readings were not statements, though expert’s conclusions based on them were), 
cert. denied (U.S. 2008). 
 
The facts of Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming did not directly raise this question, because 
there the evidence was not a machine printout but a certificate by a person, based on the 






Chart 3   IS THE OCS OFFERED FOR “TOMA”? 




1. If the evidence offered includes an "OCS” of a person, it is hearsay 
only if it is offered at trial to prove “TOMA.” 
2. TOMA = the truth of any fact that was being asserted by the 
declarant before the trial, at the time the declarant made the out-of-
court statement. 
B. TOMA Analysis 
The OCS is offered for TOMA if the proponent is asking the jury to rely on 
something the declarant said in his/her OCS as true, accurate, correct. 
The step-by-step analysis is: 
1. Who was the out-of-court declarant? 
2. What was the declarant asserting at the time he made the OCS? 
3. For what purpose, to help to prove what relevant fact, is the 
proponent offering the evidence at trial? 
4. How does the evidence tend to prove that fact? 
 Rule 5-401 relevance requires only the slightest probative value, not 
necessarily persuasive probative value. 
5. If the evidence offered HELPS TO PROVE the fact as to which it is 
offered, even if the out-of-court declarant was either insincere or 
inaccurate, the evidence is NOT HEARSAY.   
Ask, “Even if the assertions made in the OCS were incorrect, is it still 
relevant that the declarant made the statement?”  If the answer to this 
question is yes, then the evidence is nonhearsay. 
 
 
(1)  EVI offered  (determined to  
  include an OCS OF A PERSON) 
(2) MATERIAL FACT 
that EVI (1) is offered 
to help to prove 
 




 The evidence may come in for the relevant nonhearsay purpose 
(subject to exclusion under Rule 5-403).  A limiting instruction should 
be given upon request (Rule 5-105).  
 See Graves v. State, 334 Md. 30 (1994) (reversible error to admit 
arrestee’s hearsay statement to police that defendant was his 
accomplice, for nonhearsay purpose of showing why police 
included defendant’s picture in photographic array to be shown to 
victim:  limited probative value for that purpose was substantially 
outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice).   
 Sanders v. State, 194 Md. App. 162, 179-87 (2010) (no abuse of 
discretion in excluding fact that defendant made a post-Miranda 
statement to police when offered by defense for nonhearsay 
purpose, as it “likely would have confused the jury and caused it to 
speculate why the statement was not introduced into evidence”), 
vacated on other grounds, 418 Md. 368 (2011). 
C. Frequently Recurring Categories of Nonhearsay When an OCS is Relevant 
Short of Proving TOMA 
1. Sometimes the mere fact that the OCS was made is relevant, 
regardless of whether the declarant was either sincere or accurate.  In 
this event, a person testifying to the OCS can be fully cross-examined as 
to whether the OCS was made as s/he has testified. 
a. Verbal acts (a/k/a “legally operative facts”): either the substantive law 
regarding the particular type of claim or defense requires that an out-
of-court statement have been made, e.g., defamation, contracts (including 
the offer and the acceptance), wills, or gives a particular legal effect to 
that type of statement (e.g., “Your money or your life!”).   
 
These utterances are “magic words” under the substantive law; they take 
the speaker to a particular legal destination.  See Garner v. State and Fair 
v. State, in Chart 2.  
 
b. Statements offered to prove their effect on the hearer or reader, to 
prove that the hearer or reader was put on notice, or affecting the 
reasonableness of the hearer’s or reader’s subsequent conduct, e.g., “Be 
careful, the floor is wet,” or, in a negligent hiring or retention case, what 







 i. Rehabilitation of an Impeached Witness by  Evidence of 
Threats 
  Armstead v. State, 195 Md. App. 599 (2010) 
(Kenney, J.), (no error in admitting State’s witness’s 
testimony that he was scared and that his life had 
been threatened, when witness was nervous and 
made inconsistent statements, and court had given 
limiting instructions that evidence was relevant only 
to witness’s credibility and that there was no 
evidence that defendant was involved in or knew of 
the threats), cert. denied, 418 Md. 191 (2011). 
 ii. Statements offered to prove why the police took certain 
actions are relevant for the effect on the hearer, but are 
usually excluded under Rule 5-403 when offered for this 
limited purpose, due to the risk that the jury will consider 
them for their truth. 
   Morris v. State, 418 Md. 194 (2011) (Harrell, J.)   
  reaffirms this general principle, but found no error under  
  the facts there when the detective did not repeat the OCS,  
  but testified that, based on the victim’s, another officer’s,  
  and codefendant’s statements, he retrieved certain items as  
  associated with the alleged robbery.   
 c.  Statements that are offered as circumstantial evidence to prove  
 only such matters as the declarant’s being alive, conscious   
 (which may be relevant, e.g., to pain and suffering), able to speak   
 a particular language, etc. at the time s/he made the OCS. 
 d.  Prior statements made by the declarant, that are offered only  
  to impeach or rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility, but not as  
  substantive evidence. 
i. Prior inconsistent statements of the person who is sought to be 
impeached (Rules 5-613, witnesses, and 5-806, nontestifying 
hearsay declarants).  
See Handy v. State, 201 Md. App. 521 (2011) (Sharer, J.) 
(defendant’s OCS, recounting witness’s OCS, was properly 
admitted:  defendant’s as an admission of a party opponent, 
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and the OCS within it was admitted only to impeach 
witness with witness’s own statement).  
 
A party can impeach a witness or declarant with that witness’s or 
declarant’s own prior inconsistent statements.  But a party cannot 
impeach one witness with someone else’s out-of-court statement; 
to do that would be to offer the non-witness’s statement for its 
truth, which is a hearsay purpose.   
Sweetney v. State, 423 Md. 610 (2011) (Murphy, J.) (trial 
court properly precluded cross-examination of one police 
officer with out-of-court statement made by another officer 
in the same department, regarding search warrant “return” 
which did not list item that witness testified was found).  
As to Rule 5-806, cf. Taylor v. State, 407 Md. 137 (2009) 
(impeachment of a key, non-testifying declarant –whose 
OCS has been admitted for its TOMA--by extrinsic 
evidence of a prior bad act under Rule 5-608(b) must be 
allowed, if it would be permitted if the declarant had 
testified at trial). 
ii. Under certain circumstances the testimony of a witness or out-
of-court declarant may be rehabilitated by proof that that person’s 
prior statements were consistent with his trial testimony.  Rule 
5-616(c)(2). 
 
See Holmes v. State, 350 Md. 412 (1998) (Chasanow, J.) 
(use for this purpose may be permitted when substantive 
use under Rule 5-802.1(c) is not). 
 
2. Statements that depend, for their relevance, on the declarant’s having 
been sincere, but not on his/her having been factually accurate, are 
also not offered for TOMA.  Here the OCS is offered for a nonhearsay 
purpose, as circumstantial evidence to prove the declarant’s emotion, 
state of mind, knowledge, belief, intent, sanity, affection, ill will, etc., 
which is a relevant issue in the case. 
See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 397 Md. 557, 575-80 (2007) (Raker, J.) 
(evidence of defendant’s initial refusal to provide a blood sample 
was properly admitted as circumstantial evidence of consciousness 
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of guilt, as State had laid proper foundation by showing that 
defendant was told blood was needed in reference to victim’s 
health);  Holland v. State, 122 Md. App. 532 (1998) (C. Moylan, 
J.). 
Example:  In A’s trial for murder of B, the State offers, as relevant to A’s 
motive or intent, C’s testimony that A said to C a week before the murder, 
“B is a mean, nasty, rotten so-and-so.”  
How is this evidence relevant to the State’s case?  Is it relevant only  if A 
was correct as to the facts A asserted, i.e., that B was really mean, nasty, 
etc? 
No.  It will be probative simply if the declarant A believed that the fact he 
asserted was true: here, that B was nasty, etc., even if A is sadly mistaken 
about B.  The evidence may properly be admitted for a nonhearsay 
purpose, as circumstantial evidence that A disliked B, which is relevant to 
A’s motive and intent. The evidence would help to prove the fact it is 
offered at trial to prove, even if A was factually wrong, and B was 
really a kind and lovely person. 
Now assume instead that the State calls C to testify to A’s OCS one week 
before the murder, “I hate B.”  This OCS is a direct assertion by A of A’s 
state of mind, and is offered to prove that A was accurate, i.e., did have 
the state of mind, i.e., A hated B.  This OCS is offered to prove TOMA 
and is hearsay (but it will be admissible under the state of mind hearsay 
exception, Rule 5-803(b)(3)). 
D. Evidence Offered for a Nonhearsay Purpose is Not Subject to the 
Confrontation Clause 
 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (“The Clause…does not bar 
the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of 
the matter asserted.”); Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985) (defendant’s 
rights under the confrontation clause were not violated by the introduction of the 
confession of an accomplice for the nonhearsay purpose of rebutting respondent’s 







Chart 4 THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE:  IS THE HEARSAY 
“TESTIMONIAL?” 
Text of U.S. Constitution amend. VI:  An accused has the right to confront “the witness” 
against him or her. In pari materia:  Md. Decl. of Rights art. 21. 
 
I.  HEARSAY IS TESTIMONIAL (AND THUS SUBJECT TO THE RIGHT TO 
CONFRONT) IF IT IS: 
 
A. U.S. Supreme Court Cases 
   
(1) Ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing; or 
 
(2) A plea allocution; or 
 
(3)  Grand jury testimony; or 
 
(4) Prior trial testimony; or 
 
(5) “Statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations…” 
 
 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 
In Crawford, the testimonial statements were made during a “structured, recorded” 
interrogation at the police station, when the declarant and her husband were suspected of 
having committed an assault.  
 
Crawford focused on the historical context of the 6th Amendment: antipathy toward 
“Bloody Mary’s” government’s gathering of formal solemn ex parte statements to be 
used in criminal prosecution. 
 
(6) Police “interrogations solely directed at establishing the facts of a past crime, 
 in order to identify (or provide evidence to convict), the perpetrator.  The 
 product of such interrogations, whether reduced to a writing signed by the declarant or 
embedded in the memory (and perhaps notes) of the  interrogating officer, is testimonial.” 
 
Davis v. Washington, 554 U.S. 353 (2006). 
 
Both an affidavit signed by DV victim and her oral statements to police at the marital 
home,  
where her husband, Mr. Hammon, was in another room, with another officer, were 
testimonial. 
Davis’s companion case, Hammon v. Indiana, 554 U.S. 353 (2006). (J. Thomas dissented 




The Davis/Hammon Court looked at the “primary motive” (viewed 
“objectively”) of the police/police agent, in asking the particular questions:  
was it to resolve an ongoing emergency (yielding nontestimonial statements) 
or to help to prove past criminal conduct/agency “some time after the events 
described were over” (yielding testimonial statements)?  and (2) the relative 
degree of solemnity and formality of the interrogation.  Both of these factors 
were held to be relevant to what an objective declarant would take  
to be the primary purpose of his or her statements.   
 
Dictum:  “volunteered testimony” in absence of interrogation would still be 
testimonial. 
 
(7) Notarized certificates by analysts of “a state laboratory required by law to 
conduct chemical analysis upon police request” that a seized substance was cocaine 
and how much it weighed.  
 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (5 to 4 decision: dissent by J. 
Kennedy, joined by C.J. Roberts, J.Breyer and J. Alito). 
 
But dictum: “notice and demand” statutes are constitutional. Note:  The State must 
provide notice, e.g., under Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-1001 through 10-1003 of a state 
chemist’s report regarding a controlled substance before each trial, including retrials, 
even where the defense had cross-examined the expert at the first trial. Harrod v. State, 
423 Md. 24 (2011).  
 
(8) In a case like #7, the witness subject to cross must be either the person who 
performed or who witnessed the tests. (Here, the lab analyst who performed the tests, 
and certified and signed the blood alcohol concentration results, had been put on unpaid 
leave.)  
   
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S.Ct. 2705 (U.S. 2011) (same 4 dissenters as in 
Melendez-Diaz) (J. Sotomayor concurred in part). 
 
B. Maryland Cases 
 
Statements To or By Agents of Police 
 
(9) Statements of 8 and 10-year-old children in an interview by a social worker working 
in tandem with and in presence of police officers, when child abuse had been reported 
and the children  had already accused defendant to the  police. 
 
Snowden v. State, 385 Md. 641 (2005) (Harrell, J.) (adopting test of “whether the 
statements were made under circumstances that would lead an objective declarant 




(10) Nontestifying co-defendant’s written and taped statements to police at the police 
station. 
 
Codefendant had made a “miscellaneous agreement” functionally equivalent to a guilty 
plea agreement, that would become effective after defendant’s jury trial (unless the 
codefendant made a successful motion for acquittal). Because the codefendant had 
waived his right to actively participate in the trial, the trial court should have treated his 
confession under Crawford, rather than simply under Bruton. 
 
Morris v. State, 418 Md 194 (2011) (Harrell, J.). 
 
(11) DV assault victim’s excited statements to responding police, where defendant 
was known to be sitting on steps outside victim’s apartment and there were no 
apparent severe injuries requiring immediate medical attention.  
 
State v. Lucas, 407 Md. 307 (2009), (Adkins, J.). 
  
(12) Brock v. State, __Md. App.__n.5, 2012 WL 400439 (Feb. 9 2012) (D. Eyler, J.) 
(State conceded that statements declarant made to police in months following 
stabbings were testimonial). 
 
Autopsy Reports [Is M.E. an Agent of Police?] 
 
(13) “Opinions, speculation and other conclusions drawn [in autopsy reports] from 
the objective findings in autopsy reports” are testimonial. 
 





(14) Derr v. State, 422 Md. 211 (2011) (Greene, J.) held, relying on Bullcoming, that the 
Confrontation Clause demands that either the analyst who performed DNA results 
or a supervisor who observed it must testify at trial. 
 
It thus held inadmissible a testifying expert’s testimony relying in part on the results 
of another’s 2002 DNA analysis, when she had supervised only the subsequent 
“matching” 2004 DNA analysis. Derr applied the same reasoning to the results obtained 
by a serology examiner in 1985 regarding blood and semen at the time of the charged 
rape. 
 
J. Harrell, joined by J. Battaglia, concurred as to the testimony based on the 2002 DNA 
analysis, but dissented as to the expert’s testimony relying on the 1985 serological 
results, which they found to be merely “raw data” and different in several significant 




Note that the Fourth Circuit held the opposite way to Derr in United States v. Summers, 
666 F. 3d 192 (4th Cir. 2011), and that the U.S. Supreme Court has heard argument on 
this question in Williams v. Illinois. 
 
Statements to and by Medical Personnel 
 
(15) Report prepared by SAFE nurse employed by the Sexual Assault Center at Prince 
George’s Hospital, where victim had been taken by police officer (who requested certain 
tests) after victim had been examined and bandaged at another hospital; the 2nd hospital 
performed forensic tests and prescribed antibiotics; report showed location of physical 
injuries observed by SAFE nurse. 
 
Green v. State, 199 Md. App. 386 (2011). .J. Salmon, joined by Kehoe and Hotten, JJ., 
distinguished autopsy reports prepared by M.E.’s, 199 Md. App. 403-04, but also rejected 











II. HEARSAY IS NONTESTIMONIAL (AND THUS NOT REACHED BY THE  
    CONFRONTATION CLAUSE) IF IT IS: 
 
A. U.S. Supreme Court Cases 
 
(1) Business records (generally) (see Rule 5-803(b)(6)); or 
 
(2)  “Casual remarks to an acquaintance” or overheard, off-the-cuff remarks; or 
 
(3)  Statements by a coconspirator during and in furtherance of a conspiracy (see 
Rule 5-803(a)(5)); or 
 
(4)  Statements made “unwittingly” to an informant or undercover officer.   
 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 
(5) 911 call where a declarant reasonably would conclude that operator, as agent of 
police,  
“objectively” had “primary purpose” “to enable police assistance to meet an 
ongoing emergency.”  
 
N.b. The Confrontation Clause will not exclude, even if 
testimonial HS: 
(1) The accused’s own statement, or another’s adopted by 
the accused (see Rule 5-803(a)(1)-(2)). Crawford; Cox v State, 
421 Md. 630(2011) (Greene, J.); or 
(2) Dying declarations (see Rule 5-804(b)(2)). Crawford n. 6. 
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Davis v. Washington, 554 U.S. 353 (2006). 
 
Declarant-victim’s initial call in Davis was “plainly a call for help against a bona fide 
physical threat”; victim’s responses were “frantic.” 
 
(6) Dictum in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009): Merely routine 
records kept in the ordinary course of business such as of routine maintenance of 
equipment. Eg., United States v. Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d 742 (4th Cir. 2011) (Treasury 
Enforcement Communications Systems records of vehicles crossing into the United 
States and their license plates). 
 
(7) Dictum in Melendez-Diaz: Certificates of authentication of a pre-existing official 
document. 
 
(8) Shooting victim’s statements in response to police’s questions, as victim  
lay mortally wounded, outside a gas station.  
 
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S.Ct.1143 (U.S. 2011) (over vehement dissent of J. Scalia and J. 
Ginsburg).    
 
Majority opinion by J. Sotomayor held that whether statements are testimonial is 
determined by a multi-factor analysis, and the presence or absence of one factor is not 
dispositive.   
 
The factors include: (1) whether there seemed to be an ongoing emergency; (2) the 
degree of formality of the interrogation; and (3) an objective evaluation of the 
questions posed and answers given under all the circumstances in which the 
declarant made the statements at issue.  
 
As to factor (1), she noted that  a deadly weapon had been used; the medical condition 
of the victim (who here asked several times when medical help would arrive), and that 
the “zone of  
potential victims” was broader than in a domestic violence case.   
Seemingly veering away from Crawford’s historical reasoning and back toward that of  
Ohio v. Roberts’ focus on reliability, J. Sotomayor wrote:  “implicit in Davis is the 
 idea that because the prospect of fabrication in statements given for the primary purpose 
of resolving that emergency is presumed significantly diminished, the Confrontation 
Clause does not require such statements to be subject to the crucible of cross-
examination.”  
 
B. Maryland Cases 
 
Statements to Police and Their Agents 
 
(9) Dying declaration by victim, under facts similar to those in Michigan v. Bryant:  




Head v. State, 171 Md. App. 642 (2006). 
 
(10) DV victim’s excited utterances, imploring defendant to stop, heard by 911 
operator over cell phone that had been left on during the assault. 
 
Marquardt v. State, 164 Md. App. 95 (2005) (Kenney, J.), cert. denied, 390 Md. 9 
(2005). 
 
(11) DV victim’s sobbing utterances in two 911 calls, requesting police and an 
ambulance and describing defendant and his car (defendant hung up phone the first time; 
the second time victim says he has left but she knows he is coming back). 
 
Clark v. State, 188 Md. App. 110 (2009) (Alpert, J.). 
 
(12) 911 call reporting license tag numbers and color of car in which shooter had 
just fled after leaving carry-out where shooting occurred; caller noted that she was not 
summoning the police:  they were already on the way). 
 
Langley v. State, 421 Md. 560 (2011) (4 to 3 decision) (Harrell, J.) (majority relied on 
Bryant; C.J. Bell and JJ. Greene and Eldridge dissented). 
 
(13) Several excited utterances made by declarant while pacing back and forth, to 
responding police officer’s questions; declarant had himself been stabbed, while 
trying to prevent flight of assailant who had fatally stabbed declarant’s friend at a 
crowded tavern. When officer arrived, both victims were bleeding, and assailant’s 
whereabouts were unknown. Officer called for medical assistance twice, and testified it 
took the police about 30 minutes to secure the tavern and make sure the suspect was not 
still there. Weapon was a knife. Not a domestic violence case. 
 
“Viewed objectively, the total circumstances…make clear that ‘the primary 
purpose’ of the officer’s questioning…was to meet an ongoing emergency.” 
 
Brock v. State, __Md. App__ , 2012 WL 400439 (Feb. 9, 2012) (D. Eyler, J.). 
 
Statements to Medical Personnel 
 
(14) Statements by injured child to nurse examining him when admitting him to 
pediatric ward, describing who had harmed him, even though child had been brought to 
emergency room by police, who were questioning defendant. 
 








Cox v. State, 421 Md. 630 (2011) (Greene, J.) (noting similarity of facts to those of 
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, (1970)). See id. at 650.  
 
“We hold that when the State seeks to introduce an out-of-court statement against a 
criminal defendant, the proper inquiry under Crawford and Bryant is to determine 
whether a reasonable person in the declarant’s situation would have made the 
statement ‘with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial 
testimony.’ Bryant, 562 U.S. at __,131 S. Ct. at 1155.” 
 
Parts of Autopsy Reports 
 
(16) “[R]outine, descriptive and not analytical, [but] objectively ascertained and 
generally reliable facts” in autopsy reports are nontestimonial; the recording of them is 
required by Md. Health Gen. §5-311. 
 
Rollins v. State, 392 Md. 455 (2006). 
 
This portion of Rollins is arguably implicitly overruled by Melendez-Diaz and 










           
         
 
   
         
  
 No;forfeiture.  
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Authority:  Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008). N.b. not only dicta in majority opinion 
(Scalia) but also clearly the  partial concurrence (Souter & Ginsburg)  and the dissent (Breyer, 
Stevens & Kennedy) leave the door open for finding such intent upon proof of an intent to 
“isolate the victum and to stop her from reporting abuse to the authorities.”  
Is the out-of-court Declarant unavailable to 
testify now? 
Did “wrongdoing” cause that unavailability? 
Did the Accused commit (participate in, authorize or 
conspire to do) the wrongdoing? 
Did the Accused do that with the intention to prevent 
the Declarant from testifying? 
No: no forfeiture. 
Yes 
No: no forfeiture. 
No: no forfeiture. 
Yes 
Yes 
No: no forfeiture. 
Yes 
The Defendant has lost the right to confront the 
Declarant and cannot complain about the admission 
of the Declarant’s testimonial OCS’s. 
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Chart 6   HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS AND RELATED ISSUES 
 
A. OCS’S Within OCS’s :  Rule 5-805 
When evidence contains OCS’s by more than one declarant, each OCS must be 
evaluated.  If there is more than one “level” of evidence, i.e., we are asked to rely on one 
OCS to prove another OCS made earlier, then we can’t get to the earlier OCS unless the 
more recent one is admissible (either as nonhearsay or hearsay falling within a hearsay 
exception).  See Cooley v. State, 157 Md. App. 101 (2004) (one level of OCS was 
nonhearsay and the other was hearsay falling within an exception), rev’d on other 
grounds, 385 Md. 165 (2005); State v. Jones, 138 Md. App. 178 (2001) (Hollander, J.). 
 
B. Hearsay Exceptions that Are Applicable Only if the Declarant Testifies at Trial and is 
Subject to Cross-Examination:  Rule 5-802.1 
 
 N.b:  The hearsay may be proved by the testimony of someone other than the declarant, 
as long as the prerequisites of the Rule are met. 
 
1. Rule 5-802.1(a): A subcategory of a testifying witness’s prior inconsistent 
statements (“Nance statements”). 
 
      The required foundation:   
 
a. The witness-declarant must testify at trial and be subject to cross-examination    
concerning the statement; and  
 
b. If this requirement is met, then Rule 5-802.1(a) permits substantive use of a    
witness’s prior inconsistent statements if they are either: 
 
(1) written and signed; or 
(2) stenographically or electronically recorded; or 
(3) made under oath at deposition, trial, or in a hearing or another proceeding,   
including a grand jury proceeding. 
 
E.g., Marlin v. State, 192 Md. App. 134, 144-47 (2010) (Hollander, J.)(recanting 
witness’s prior inconsistent, audio recorded statement to police was properly 
admitted by J. Glynn), cert. denied, 415 Md. 339 (2011).  
 
2. Rule 5-802.1(b):  A Subcategory of a Testifying Witness’s Prior  
                 Consistent Statements 
 




a. Witness must testify at trial and be “subject to cross-examination concerning 
the statement”; 
 
b.  Prior statement must be consistent with witness’s testimony at trial; 
 
c. Prior statement must be “offered to rebut an expressed or implied charge 
against the declarant of fabrication, or improper influence or motive;” and 
 
d. Prior statement must precede the alleged improper influence or motive to be 
admissible as substantive evidence under Rule 5-802.1(b).  Holmes v. State, 
350 Md. 412, 712 A.2d 554 (1998) (Chasanow, J.); Thomas v. State, 202 Md. 
App. 386 (2011) (Raker, J.). 
 
3. Rule 5-802.1(c):   The Witness’s Prior Identification of a Person (at a Line-Up, 
etc.) 
  
  E.g.,Marlin v. State, 192 Md. App. 134, 144-47 (2010) (Hollander, J.) (finding 
evidence of identification at photo array by recanting witness admissible), cert. 
denied, 415 Md. 339 (2011). 
 
  N.b.: Due process issue arises only if state action has made the circumstances 
unduly suggestive.  Wood v. State, 196 Md. App. 146, 151- 63 (2010) (C. 
Moylan, J.), cert denied, 418 Md. 192 (2011).  Accord Perry v. New Hampshire, 
132 S.Ct. 716 (U.S. 2012). 
 
4. Rule 5-802.1(d):  Prompt Report of Sexual Assault, Consistent with Declarant’s 
Trial Testimony 
  
  Required foundation: 
 
a. Witness must testify at trial and be “subject to cross-examination concerning 
the   statement”; 
 
b. Prior statement must be consistent with witness’s testimony at  trial; 
  
c. Prior statement must have been a victim’s “prompt complaint of sexually 
assaultive behavior.”  See Nelson v. State, 137 Md. App. 402 (2001) (C. 
Moylan, J.) (13-year old girl’s statement to her 11-year-old sister, made 
shortly after defendant left their apartment, that defendant had raped her, 
qualified for admission under Rule 5-802.1(d); victim’s statements a day later 
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to her school counselor and to a nurse-sexual assault examiner would likely 
also have qualified but no objections to them were preserved). 
 
d. These are admissible in both civil and criminal cases. 
 
5. Rule 802.1(e): Recorded Recollection… 
 
6. “Tender Years” Exception, Md. Crim. Pro. Code Ann. § 11-304, amended 
effective October 1, 2011 
 
  Changes made: 
 
1. The statute applies to child victims under the age of 13 at the time of the OCS, 
rather than only under 12.  
 
2. It adds to the categories of potential witnesses who can testify to the child’s    
                              statement: 
a. a counselor licensed or certified in accordance with Md. Code Ann., 
Health Occ. tit. 17; and 
 
              b. a therapist licensed or certified in accordance with Md. Code Ann. 
Health Occ. tit. 17. 
  
3. In a criminal proceeding or in a juvenile proceeding other than a CINA 
proceeding, the child victim must testify at the proceeding. 
 
4. The prosecution must give pretrial notice not only of the State’s intention to 
introduce the child’s out-of-court statement, but also must provide to the 
defense any audio or visual record of the statement or, if there is no such 
recording, the content of the statement. 
 
5. In making its determination as to the admissibility of the child’s statement, the 
court may find that a recording of the statement makes it unnecessary for the 
judge to examine the child victim.   
 
C. Rule 5-803: Hearsay Exceptions Applicable Regardless Whether the Declarant is  
     Available or Unavailable to Testify at Trial, and Regardless Whether the Declarant   
     Testifies or Not  
 
These OCS’s may be proved by the declarant’s own testimony to his or her OCS or 




1. Rule 5-803(a), Statement by Party-Opponent:  Opposing party’s own, adopted, 
authorized, agent’s, or a co-conspirator’s (often referred to as “admissions”) of a 
party-opponent.   
 
a. Any such statement offered by one party, against the opposing party who 
made the adopted, etc. statement will not be excluded by the hearsay rule.   
 
b. The phrase “admission against interest,” found in some case law, is a 
misleading, mythological creature.  Unlike under Rule 5-804(b)(3) 
(“declaration against interest” by a now unavailable declarant), under Rule 5-
803(a) there is no requirement that the OCS or “admission of a party 
opponent” have been disserving to the declarant at the time it was made. 
 
c. Rule 5-803(a)(1): Statement of party opponent by that party himself 
 
Flight Evidence:  State v. Shim, 418 Md. 37, 56-59 (2011) (Adkins, J.) (error to 
have given “flight” instruction to jury when evidence showed only that defendant 
left scene of crime and took various steps to avoid being apprehended:  these steps 
did not amount to “flight”). 
 
Song Lyrics:  Hannah v. State, 420 Md. 339 (2011) (Murphy, J.) held that the 
trial court had committed reversible error in permitting the prosecutor to admit on 
cross-examination, after the alleged shooter-defendant had testified that he had no 
access to handguns and had never held one, the defendant’s drawing of a gun and 
ten rap lyrics he had written about guns and shootings. 
 
The appellate court distinguished inadmissible works of fiction from possibly 
admissible autobiographical statements of historical fact.  It found that the 
evidence in this case lacked the special relevance needed to make it admissible 
under Rule 5-404(b), and amounted to mere propensity evidence as to violence.  
Finally, the door had not been opened by defendant’s direct examination. 
 
d. Rule 5-803(a)(2):  Adoptive Admissions 
 
(i) Defendant adopted alleged coconspirator’s statements to a fellow inmate by 
standing by and adding details. Cox v. State, 194 Md. App. 629 (2010) (Graeff, 
J.) (affirming J. Watts), aff’d, 421 Md. 630 (2011) (Greene, J.) (Court of Appeals 
did not reach this issue: see n.4). 
 
(ii) State’s plea agreement with a witness that the witness would testify truthfully 
did not make that witness’s actual testimony at trial of a likely codefendant 
admissible as an adoptive admission by the State in the subsequent trial of the 
defendant.  Defense was permitted to call witness, but not to prove plea 
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agreement.  Armstead v. State, 195 Md. App. 599 (2010) (Kenney, J.), cert. 
denied, 418 Md. 191 (2011). 
  
  (iii)Tacit Admissions (by Silence:  A person’s silence in the face of another’s 
statement can be interpreted as asquiescence in the truth of (adoption by silence 
of) the other’s statement when three conditions are met: 
     
  (1)The party-opponent (or party’s agent, etc.) heard the other’s statement; 
 
  (2)The circumstances allowed for the party-opponent (or agent, etc.) to reply; and 
 
(3)Under the circumstances, ordinarily a person similarly situated who was in 
disagreement would “speak up” and correct the speaker. 
 
These preliminary facts regarding tacit admission (and other adoptive admissions 
also addressed by Rule 5-803(a)(2)) fall under Rule 5-104(b).  If a reasonable 
jury could find them to be met, the judge should admit the evidence (subject to 
Rule 5-403). 
 
 2. Rule 5-803(b):  Exceptions that Apply Whether or Not the Declarant 
Testifies at Trial 
 
a. Rule 5-803(b)(1), Present sense impressions:  a very small window of time. 
 
   Foundation elements: 
 
(i) The OCS was made while the declarant was perceiving the 
event, or immediately afterwards; and 
    
   (ii) The OCS merely describes or explains the event. 
 
b. Rule 5-803(b)(2), Excited utterances:  a bigger window, as long as the 
declarant was still so upset by the event that s/he was not thinking before 
speaking, so as to be able to fabricate a self-serving statement. 
 
   Foundation elements: 
 
   (i) a startling event occurred; 
 
   (ii) OCS was made while the declarant remained under such stress 
that s/he could not stop to think (and thus to fabricate a self-serving 
statement) (look at all the relevant circumstances, including declarant’s 
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emotional state, time lapse, and whether leading questions were asked); 
and 
 
   (iii) The OCS relates to the starting event. 
 
   Witness, such as police officer, must lay foundation: describe affect of 
declarant; time lapse; questions asked, if any; other evidence of starting 
event, injuries, etc. 
 
  c. Rule 5-803(b)(3), Statements by declarant as to his or her present 
state of mind or physical condition: Declarant’s assertions of his or her 
then-existing state of mind  or physical condition (nonhearsay if not 
offered for TOMA, but admissible hearsay under Rule 5-803(b)(3) if 
offered for TOMA of the accused’s asserted state of mind, rather than to 
prove a fact remembered or believed by the declarant).  See Shepard v. 
United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933). 
 
 









   Declarant’s OCS as to his/her state of mind existing at time of OCS is: 
 
   (i) Admissible to show declarant’s state of mind, when relevant. 
 
   See Edery v. Edery, 193 Md. App. 215 (2010) (Meredith, J.) 
(decedent’s statements that she wanted to be buried in Israel 
were improperly excluded when offered to show her wishes). 
 
   Ex.Victim’s statements of her fear of the defendant, made before her 
murder, and a domestic violence protective order that prohibited the 
defendant from entering the victim’s home, admissible as relevant to 
defense raised that victim had invited defendant into her home, and 
Rule 5-803(b)(3)  Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition 
A statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or 
physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily 
health), offered to prove the declarant’s then existing condition or the declarant’s future 
action, but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered 




gun went off accidentally.  Case v. State, 188 Md. App. 279 (1997) 
(Murphy, J.). 
     
   (ii) Admissible to show declarant’s subsequent action, after  the 
statement, in accordance with stated intent.  Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. 
Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892). 
 
   Ex.  “I’m going to skip school tomorrow,” admissible to show 
 declarant played hooky the next day. 
 
   See Figgins v. Cochrane, 174 Md. App. 1, 27-31, (2007) (C. Moylan, 
J.) (Hillmon analysis inapplicable when no contention that declarant 
subsequently acted in accord with stated intent), aff’d, 430 Md. 392 
(2008). 
 
   In Smith v. State, 423 Md. 573 (2011) (Rodowsky, J.) where 
the critical issue was whether the defendant had shot the victim 
or the victim had committed suicide, it was reversible error to 
admit State’s evidence tending to show that the victim was not 
depressed, but to exclude testimony of a trooper --who had 
arrested the victim for DWI one month before the victim’s 
death-- that the victim appeared to be depressed, stressed about 
the situation, and  that the victim said to trooper, “This is the 
last thing I need in my life right now on top of all the…other 
shit going on in my life.”  
 
   The Court of Appeals did not analyze whether the OCS was offered 
for TOMA.  The OCS could have been relevant just to show that was 
how the victim felt, not that a lot really was going on in the victim’s 
life, in which case it would have been admissible as nonhearsay. 
 
   (iii) But inadmissible (under this hearsay exception) to show 
something that occurred prior to the statement, that  caused 
declarant to have the particular state of mind.   Shepard v. United 
States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933). 
 
   Ex. “I hate Phil because he hits me and breaks my toys.” Admissible 
to show that declarant hates/dislikes Phil, if that is relevant to the case; 
inadmissible to show that Phil has hit the declarant. 
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  d. Rule 5-803(b)(4), Statement of past or present facts, made while 
seeking medical treatment or diagnosis in contemplation of possible 
treatment. 









   Required foundation: 
 
   (i) OCS made by person seeking medical treatment, should medical 
treatment become necessary; and 
 
   (ii) Declarant knew that OCS would be relied on for possible 
treatment. (This is the circumstantial guarantee of sincerity.) 
 
   If a patient is a child, it is particularly important that the doctor or 
nurse explains to the patient (or other declarant, e.g., parent) that 
what is said by the patient (or other declarant) will determine 
treatment.  See State v. Coates, 405 Md. 131 (2008) (Greene, J.) 
(reversible error to admit evidence); Low v. State, 119 Md. 413 (1998) 
(Thieme and Byrnes, JJ.). 
 
(iii) Only the facts related in the OCS that are reasonably pertinent to  
medical treatment or diagnosis in contemplation of treatment will be 
properly admissible. 
 
   Query: 
   Can the identification of the person who causes injuries ever be 
pertinent to medical treatment and thus admissible under 5-803(b)(4)? 
 
   Yes, e.g., to identify poison given;, and thus the proper antidote. 
 
   If child abuse, “not ordinarily.” State v. Coates, 405 Md. 131 
(2008) (Greene, J.), affg 175 Md. App. 588 (2002) (Hollander, 
J.) (it was known at time of OCS that child no longer had any 
contact with its perpetrator).  But see In re Rachel T., 77 Md. 
Rule 5-803(b)(4) Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment 
 Statements made for purposes of medical treatment or medical diagnosis in 
contemplation of treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, 
pain, or sensation, or the inception or general character of the cause or external sources 
thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis in contemplation of 
treatment.   
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App. 20, 33-36 (1988)  (yes, due to possible testing for STD; 
possible removal from home). 
 
   A number of federal cases hold that relevance to psychological 
treatment, because of abuse, is sufficient. 
 
e. Rule 5-803(b)(6)-(23)…Another day! 
 
f.  Rule 5-803(b)(24), the “catch-all” exception 
 
   Brock v. State, ___ Md. App. ____, 2012 WL 400439 (Feb. 9, 
2012) (D. Eyler, J.) (trial court properly excluded unavailable 
declarant’s OCS—recanting prior statements identifying 
defendant to police-- when offered by defense for TOMA; 
finding also that defense barely preserved the issue of whether 
the OCS was admissible to impeach the declarant under Rule 
5-806, the court held that exclusion of the OCS was harmless 
error, in light of the other evidence in the case, where the OCS 
offered by State did not directly identify defendant). 
 
D.  Hearsay Exceptions Applicable Only When the Declarant is Shown, under 
Rule 5-804(a), to be Unavailable to Testify 
 
 1. Rule 5-804(b)(1), Prior testimony now offered against a party who had 
an opportunity and similar motive to examine the declarant at the earlier 
proceeding. 
 
  In Williams v. State, 416 Md. 670 (2010) (Raker, J.), the State had violated its 
discovery obligation under Rule 4-263(d), when it had not disclosed impeaching 
information known to a police officer that came to light after the first trial: that a 
key eye witness had said she was “legally blind.”  The eyewitness died before the 
retrial.   
 
  The second trial judge admitted the witness’s videotaped testimony along with 
medical records about her vision and the detective’s testimony that she had told 
him she was legally blind.  The Court of Appeals’ majority found these steps an 
inadequate substitute for the ability to cross-examine the eyewitness.  It concluded 
that:  “On remand, if the State wishes to introduce portions of the previously 
recorded testimony, the trial court should redact any portion which relates to what 
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she might have seen or testimony depending upon her vision.”  Judge Murphy, 
joined by Judge Rodowsky, dissented. 
 
2. Rule 5-804(b)(2), Dying declarations.   
 
See Head v. State, Chart 4. 
 
3.  Rule 5-804(b)(3), Statements against interest. 
 
The Court of Appeals amended Rule 5-804(b)(3), effective January 1, 2011, so as to 
parallel the corollary amendment of Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3).  The rule now makes it 
clear that whenever a statement against interest is offered “in a criminal case” under 
this hearsay exception, the requirement that “corroborating circumstances clearly 
indicate the trustworthiness of the statement” applies.  
 
The earlier language restricting the application of this requirement to statements 
offered to “exculpate the accused,” see Gray v. State, 368 Md. 529 (2002) (Cathell, 
J.), has been deleted. 
 
          4.    Rule 5-804(b)(4), Statements of personal or family history, such as lineage. 
 
         5.   The forfeiture by wrongdoing exceptions: Md. Rule 5-804(b)(5) (civil); Md. Cts.    
                & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 10-901 (certain criminal cases only). 
 
                Both rules restrict the types of statements potentially admissible to only recorded or     
                written and signed statements (the same types that are also potentially substantively                  
                admissible prior inconsistent statements under Md. Rule 5-802.1(a), when the    
                declarant testifies at trial).  They also impose a notice requirement on the party    
                seeking to offer evidence under the forfeiture exception. 
 
     The criminal statute foregoes the usual preliminary fact standards of Rule 5-104(a)    
     and instead requires:  (1) proof “by clear and convincing evidence that the party    
     against  whom the statement is offered engaged in, directed, or conspired to commit  
     the wrongdoing that procured the unavailability of the declarant”;  and (2) that the  
     rules of  evidence are “strictly applied” by the court in making this determination.    
 
     The criminal statute applies only in trials for certain crimes (generally, crimes of   
               violence and drug crimes). 
 
E.  Issues Related to Witness Intimidation 
 





  Longus v State, 416 Md. 433 (2010) (Greene, J.) (violation of defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to public trial was reversible error; State’s proffer 
of witness intimidation was inadequate to support exclusion from 
courtroom of two spectators, when there was neither specific showing that 
they had threatened the witness nor a voir dire of the witness, and the 
defense was not given an opportunity to respond to State’s proffer) (note 
that, although J. Greene authored the plurality opinion, four judges and 
thus the court’s majority – J. Harrell, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part, and J. Murphy, joined by J. Battaglia and J. Adkins, applied the 
“substantial reason” test for justification of partial closure rather than the 
“overriding interest’ test applied by J. Greene).   
 
2.      Safety and Anonymity of Jurors 
 
  By a Rules Order effective September 1, 2011, the Court of Appeals adopted 
new rules permitting a trial judge, who determines that juror safety or possible 
harassment or tampering is a concern, to protect the identity of jurors by having 
them referred to only by number rather than by name. Md. Rule 4-312(c) . 
 
F. Authentication of Internet and Cell Phone Evidence 
 
1. Social Media 
 
  Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343 (2011) (Battaglia, J.) (finding inadequate 
authentication of MySpace profile and posting as coming from 
defendant’s girlfriend despite circumstantial evidence).  JJ. Harrell and 
Murphy dissented.   
 
2. E-Mails, I-M’s, and Text Messages 
 
  Dictum in Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343, 361 n. 13 (2011) (“We further 
note that authentication concerns attendant to e-mails, instant messaging 
correspondence, and text messages differ significantly from those 
involving a MySpace profile and posting printout, because such 
correspondences [sic] is sent directly from one party to an intended 







3. Cell Phone Calls 
 
  Carpenter v. State, 196 Md. App. 212, 225-30 (2010) (Thieme, J.) (both 
direct and circumstantial evidence properly authenticated sources of calls 
missed and received by cell phone; expert information technology 
evidence was not required). 
 
G. “By the Way” 
 
1. Federal Rules Restyled 
 
  The U.S. Supreme Court approved a “restyled” version of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, which became effective December 1, 2011.  The Committee notes 
accompanying each restyled rule emphasize that no substantive change in the 
rules is intended.  The revisions are stylistic only and are meant to modernize and 
clarify the language of the rules.  The revised rules and their complete legislative 
history may be found at 
www.uscourts.gov/RulesandPolicies/FederalRulemaking/Overview.aspx. 
 
2. More Information  
 
  More information on Maryland and federal evidence law is included in McLain, 
volumes 5, 6, and 6A of MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL, which is 
accessible on Westlaw as “[vol. no.] Maryland Evidence [sec. no.]”  The section 
numbers generally correlate with the root of the Md. Rule number, e.g., Md. Rule 
5-103 is discussed  at §§ 103:1 et seq. and can be pulled up as “5 Maryland 
Evidence 103:1.” Volume 5 addresses the 100’s-400’s Rules; volume 6 covers 
privileges through the 700’s rules; Volume 6A covers 800’s-1000’s, plus the parol 
evidence rule at §1101:1. 
 
 
